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APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) 
Court of Appeals have appellate jurisdiction under 28 USC§ 1292(a)(3) when a 
district court sitting in admiralty decides the merits of a case but does not rule on 
claims of indemnity and contribution. 
Becker v. Poling Transportation Corp. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
356 F.3d 381 
(Decided February 2, 2004) 
Poling Transportation Corporation ("Poling") employed plaintiffs, Philip Becker 
("Becker") and John Jurgens ("Jurgens"). On August 18, 1995, plaintiffs were 
transferring petroleum from a decrepit barge to a dockside truck. The barge was owned 
by Poling but was about to be sold. The terms of the sale required that the barge be 
delivered empty. Poling's dispatcher offered the petroleum contained in the barge to 
Metro Fuel Oil Corp. ("Metro") free of charge provided that Metro arrange to transfer the 
raw material from the barge. Due to the barge's broken pumping mechanism, Poling 
advised Metro that a vacuum truck would be needed to transfer the petroleum. Despite 
this warning, Metro asked Ultimate Transport Inc. ("Ultimate") to pick up the petroleum. 
At trial, it was established that Metro was aware that Ultimate lacked the proper 
equipment to transfer the petroleum. 
On the morning of August 181h, Becker and Jurgens removed water from barge 
using a portable pump. Poling's dispatcher informed them that later in the day a vacuum 
truck would be arriving to remove the petroleum. At approximately 5:30 p.m., 
Ultimate's truck arrived to transfer the petroleum. The truck was not equipped with a 
vacuum and the driver informed the plaintiffs that Ultimate did not own any vacuum 
trucks. The truck driver from Ultimate and the two plaintiffs decided to utilize the 
portable pump to transfer the petroleum from the barge to Ultimate's truck. Plaintiffs 
used the portable pump to fill the first holding compartment of the truck without incident. 
However, after the pump was restarted in the truck's second holding tank a fire broke out 
severely burning both Becker and Jurgens. It was undisputed that the use of the portable 
pump instead of a vacuum truck was the cause of the fire. 
Plaintiffs brought this suit against Poling, Ultimate, and Metro asserting claims 
under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688. Poling filed for 
bankruptcy; Ultimate defaulted and then settled for $250,000 each to Becker and Jurgens, 
leaving Metro as the only defendant to stand trial. Before trial, Metro moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that it owed no duty to plaintiffs and that their 
behavior was the superseding and intervening cause of the injuries sustained. This 
motion was denied and a jury trial was held on the issue of liability before Magistrate 
Judge Levy. 
The jury was given a special verdict form which solicited answers on questions 
relating to Ultimate's status as an independent contractor, the inherently dangerous nature 
of the work performed, Metro's knowledge of Ultimate's incompetence to perform the 
work, Ultimate's negligence, and Ultimate's negligence as a substantial cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries. The jury returned answers of yes to all of these questions. While the 
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jury did find Poling negligent its actions were not found to be the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs' injuries. However, no question was posed as to whether Metro's negligence in 
contracting Ultimate was a substantial or proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The 
omission of this question proved troublesome for the Magistrate Judge and the parties. 
Considering that available options were limited by the lack of a finding on proximate 
cause with respect to Metro's negligence, the Magistrate Judge felt compelled to find 
Metro only vicariously liable. 
The Magistrate then declined to apply the rule of McDermott, Inc v. AmClyde, 
511 U.S. 202 (1994), which holds that when multiple parties contribute to a plaintiffs 
injury, a settlement by one defendant does not affect the amount of liability of the non­
settling defendants. The Magistrate decline to apply McDermott because he felt it was 
only applicable when defendants are joint tortfeasors and not applicable in situations, like 
this, where a party is only vicariously liable. The Magistrate then entered a judgment 
against Metro for the amount of the verdict, $530,000 and $505,000 for Jurgens and 
Becker respectively, reduced by the amount of the settlement with Ultimate resulting in a 
judgment of $255,000 for Becker and $280,000 for Jurgens. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the final 
judgment of the Magistrate Judge. The Circuit Court first considered its jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal. The Magistrate Judge failed to address Metro's claims against Ultimate 
for indemnity and contribution, which were neither never served upon Ultimate nor 
dismissed. The fact that these claims were never decided gave the Circuit Court authority 
to considered the entire interlocutory appeal. 
Generally, where a pending indemnification claim is undecided at the district 
court level, the decision from which the appeal is made is not final and therefore a Circuit 
Court cannot have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1292(a)(3) allows Circuit Courts to hear "Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or 
the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in 
which appeals from final decrees are allowed." The Second Circuit in Thypin Steel Co. v. 
Asoma Corp., 2 15 F.3d 273, 279 (2d Cir. 2000), has interpreted this statute to allow 
appellate jurisdiction where a court sitting in admiralty had decided the merits but left 
unsettled the issue of assessing damages to the defendants. The crucial inquiry for an 
appellate court in matters such as this is "whether the judgment has determined the rights 
and liabilities of the parties which ... means deciding the merits of the controversies 
between them." The court found that the Magistrate's judgment below met this test 
because the jury's affirmative answers to the questions of Ultimate's incompetence to 
perform the work and Metro's knowledge of Ultimate's incompetence rendered Metro 
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs' injuries, therefore deciding the rights and 
liabilities of the parties. The court found this ruling consistent with the holdings of other 
Circuits. 
On the issue of Metro's liability the court found it unnecessary to determine 
whether the jury's findings could impose liability based on the theory that an employer, 
who hires an independent contractor and has reason to know that the work is inherently 
dangerous, is vicariously liable for injuries caused by the contractor. The court instead 
found that Metro was directly liable to the plaintiffs because when a party itself is 
negligent in selecting the contractor, it is directly liable to the plaintiff for their injuries. 
In analyzing the case of Kleeman v. Rheingold, 8 1  N.Y.2d 270 ( 1993), the court found 
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that negligent hiring is not a form of vicariously liability but a form of direct liability. 
This finding was also in agreement with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 ( 1965). 
The fact that no question of proximate cause was put to the jury on this question created 
no injustice according to the court. Metro was deemed to have waived the issue of 
proximate cause when it failed to submit the proximate cause issue to the jury under Rule 
49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Assuming arguendo, that failing to put this issue to the jury was error; it was not 
prejudicial to Metro. The jury's findings that Becker's and Jurgens' injuries were caused 
by Ultimate's failure to use a vacuum truck and that Metro was negligent in knowingly 
selecting Ultimate despite its lack of a vacuum truck lead to the conclusion that the 
injuries caused by Ultimate and Metro are factually indistinguishable. Under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §433A ( 1965) and United States v. A/can Aluminum 
Corp., 990 F.2d 7 1 1, 722 (2d Cir. 1993), where the acts of joint tortfeasors cause a single 
harm, the damages are not severable and each tortfeasor is liable for the full amount. 
The court then rejected Metro's argument that Becker's and Jurgens' use of the 
portable pump was a superseding, intervening cause of their injuries that should absolve 
Metro of liability. Metro's argument was framed as an appeal from the district court's 
denial of summary judgment. The court held that such an appeal was procedurally inept 
as the "denial of a motion for summary judgment is moot in light of the fact that the case 
has since been tried before a jury." Such an argument would be procedurally valid only 
when an appropriate objection was made at trial or if the error would result in an 
InJUstice. The court found no evidence of Metro raising the issue of superseding, 
intervening cause at trial and could find "no possible miscarriage of justice" by affirming 
the lower court's decision. 
Finally, the court refused to hear the issue of offsetting the judgment amount by 
the amount of settlement with Ultimate because there was no cross-appeal by the 
plaintiffs. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Magistrate Judge leaving Metro 
jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs' injuries. 
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